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Madagascar’s fluid party system: Authoritarian legacies and an uneven 
playing field in an enduring competitive authoritarian regime1 
Party systems are expected to grow and mature with time; however, the case of 
Madagascar is one of high fluidity: parties and leaders rise and fall from one election to 
the next and there is a low entry cost for new contenders. This study explores the role of 
authoritarian legacies and elites’ efforts to skew the playing field as key factors for under-
standing why the Malagasy party system has failed to institutionalise since the start of 
the Third Republic. The findings show how leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personal-
ism and clientelism shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and 
also how incumbents’ attempts to create asymmetries in access to resources, media and 
law have been ineffective and successfully countervailed by the opposition. 
Keywords: Madagascar, elections, parties, party systems, authoritarian 
legacies, level playing field
O sistema partidário fluído de Madagáscar: Legados autoritários e condições 
de competição desiguais em um regime autoritário competitivo duradouro
Espera-se que os sistemas partidários cresçam e amadureçam com o tempo; no entanto, 
o caso de Madagáscar é de alta fluidez: há elevada volatilidade entre partidos e líderes em 
sucessivas eleições, e os novos competidores facilmente são eleitos. Este estudo explora o 
papel dos legados autoritários e as estratégias de distorção das condições de competição 
eleitoral enquanto fatores-chave para entender por que razões o sistema partidário malga-
xe não se institucionalizou desde o início da Terceira República. Os resultados demons-
tram que a centralização da liderança partidária, a etnicidade, o personalismo e o cliente-
lismo moldaram a formação dos partidos durante – e para além – do período autoritário; 
e que as tentativas dos incumbentes de criar assimetrias no acesso a recursos, meios de 
comunicação e legislação têm sido ineficazes e compensadas com sucesso pela oposição.
Palavras-chave: Madagáscar, eleições, partidos, sistemas partidários, legados 
autoritários, igualdade nas condições de competição 
Recebido: 04 de dezembro de 2019
Aceite: 21 de dezembro de 2019
1  The authors would like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading and insightful comments. This 
work has been supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology through the project 
CEECIND/02527/2017 and the PhD scholarship SFRH/BD/145649/2019. 
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Finding the reasons why some party systems grow and mature with time 
while others remain fluid is an exercise that is both relevant and challenging. 
Though a constellation of macro-level factors – historical legacies, political insti-
tutions, economics, social structure – combine to explain the likelihood of institu-
tionalisation or stabilisation over time2, there are also striking variations within 
and across regions (Sanches, 2018). The great diversity in the format and func-
tioning of African party systems offers an excellent laboratory for revisiting the 
weight of existing explanations. In fact, while dominant parties and party sys-
tems have proliferated in countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania and 
Mozambique (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010), those in Madagascar, Kenya, Comoros 
and Zambia, just to name a few examples, have experienced massive vote shifts 
in elections, high fragmentation and the frequent emergence and success of new 
parties and independent candidates (Salih & Nordlund, 2007; Sanches, 2018). 
This article’s main goal is to understand why Madagascar’s party system has 
failed to institutionalise over repeated elections and remains as fluid as it was at 
the beginning of the Third Republic.
Existing scholarship shows that the passing of time has had little effect on 
party system development in Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; 
Sanches, 2018), whereas authoritarian legacies have lasting effects (LeBas, 2011; 
Riedl, 2014). Thus, parties that, during authoritarianism, were able to rely on 
pre-existing organisational structures (LeBas, 2011) or to garner support by in-
corporating local elites (Riedl, 2014) were better able to endure over time. Though 
also acknowledging the relevance of these historical legacies, this study proposes 
a more dynamic framework. 
The overall argument is that the way politics plays out in the present results 
from a mix between the legacies from prior historical periods, and the extent 
to which political elites are continuously able to make the playing field uneven 
(Levitsky & Way, 2010b). Consequently, where parties mainly rely on personal or 
material resources to build support (Levitsky & Way, 2013) and fail to effectively 
skew the competition in their favour (Levitsky & Way, 2010b) they will be more 
likely to fragment over time. This argument is tested in the case of Madagascar, 
which is relevant for at least three reasons. 
2  Institutionalisation and its dimensions have been measured variously in studies spanning all regions in the 
world, but stability has come to be considered its most relevant aspect (Casal Bértoa, 2018; Mainwaring, 2018). 
Institutionalisation and stability are often used interchangeably, and are conceptually connected. Stability 
expresses the extent to which a stable set of parties interact in relatively stable ways over time (Mainwaring, 
2018), while institutionalisation is a more complex phenomenon, referring to “the process by which a practice or 
organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 25). 
In Africa, scholars have ranged from using multiple indicators and dimensions of institutionalisation (Kuenzi & 
Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Sanches, 2018), to focusing exclusively on stability (Lindberg, 2007; Ferree, 2010). 
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First, it is one of the few countries with experience of a multi-party system pri-
or to the start of the democratic wave in Africa in the early 1990s. Elections were 
competitive during the First Republic (1960-1975) and, although they became 
more restrictive in the Second Republic (1975-1993), parties were allowed to run 
as long as they supported the state’s socialist ideals by joining the National Front 
for the Defence of the Revolution (FNDR) dominated by the ruling Vanguard 
for the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) (Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). Second, though 
the Third Republic (1993-2010) marked a transition to more democratic elections, 
at least formally, in practice the regime remained “competitive authoritarian” 
(Bogaards & Elischer, 2016, p. 12; Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 276), meaning that 
“electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and vary-
ing degrees of harassment and violence” often skewed the playing field in favour 
of incumbents (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). Third, Madagascar is often depicted as 
an “unstable competitive authoritarian regime” characterised by weak parties, 
and recurrent political crises (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2010a). 
In this sense, it resembles other cases in the continent (e.g. Malawi, Kenya and 
Zambia). 
The study is structured as follows: The theoretical section highlights the ma-
jor trends in electoral politics in Africa since the 1990s and presents the theo-
retical framework. Then Madagascar’s key political and historical developments 
are briefly described. The following sections examine the role of authoritarian 
legacies in party building and mobilisation strategies, as well as the tactics used 
by incumbents to skew the playing field. Drawing on multiple sources of data 
including electoral data, election observation reports and legislation, our find-
ings show that leadership centralisation, ethnicity, personalism and clientelism 
shaped party formation during the authoritarian era and beyond; and that in-
cumbents use their advantage to create asymmetries in access to resources, me-
dia and law. Interestingly, however, the analysis also indicates that the strategies 
used to skew the playing field only produce short term gains; they do not prevent 
rotation in power in a subsequent election. This set of findings contributes to an 
understanding of “competitive authoritarianism” in contexts of high instability, 
weak parties, weak state capacity and ineffective power structures. This will be 
discussed further in the concluding section. 
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Understanding party systems in Africa
African party systems are often characterised by high levels of electoral 
and legislative volatility, loose linkages with society and low legitimacy ac-
corded to elections and political parties (Basedau, 2007; Kuenzi & Lambright, 
2001; Lindberg, 2007; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018). However, there are also strik-
ing cross-country variations. Of a sample of democratic countries, Ghana and 
Cabo Verde feature stable party systems in which two organisationally strong 
parties truly aspire to form a government, while dominant parties in Botswana 
and South Africa have never experienced loss of power, and Mauritius has seen 
a succession of various coalitions (Resnick, 2011; Sanches, 2018). In the group of 
authoritarian regimes – e.g. Angola, Gambia, Gabon, Zimbabwe and Equatorial 
Guinea – dominant parties and party systems are more prevalent. Incumbents 
often rely on multiparty elections, parliaments and coercion to prolong their 
authoritarian rule (Bogaards & Elischer, 2016). Finally, in the cluster of hybrid 
regimes3 – e.g. Zambia, Comoros, Madagascar and Kenya – party systems have 
remained unstable since the first multiparty elections (Sanches, 2018). These are 
just some instances, from a broader sample, of the diversity and dynamics of 
African party systems. 
To explain this diversity, scholars have looked at a constellation of structural, 
institutional and economic factors. Ethnicity is assumed to be the quintessential 
social cleavage in Africa and to strongly influence party competition (Erdmann, 
2007). Most relevant parties emerged out of crystallised territorial and ethnic 
cleavages (Manning, 2005) and rely on these identities to build support (Salih & 
Nordlund, 2007). Furthermore, it has been shown that a party system can insti-
tutionalise if parties are able to cut across ethnic divisions and construct winning 
coalitions (Ferree, 2010; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 2018; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014), 
while political institutions and the economy generally have a small and unsys-
tematic effect. In any case, studies show that presidential and proportional sys-
tems, as well as economic growth, engender higher levels of party system stabil-
ity or institutionalisation (Ferree, 2010; Kuenzi et al., 2017; Riedl, 2014; Sanches, 
2018). 
A final set of explanations relevant to this study highlights the role of author-
itarian legacies – specifically “behavioural patterns, rules, relationships, social 
and political situations, and also norms, procedures and institutions, either in-
troduced or strongly and patently strengthened by the immediately preceding 
authoritarian regime” (Morlino, 2010, p. 508). Thus, LeBas (2011) argues that, 
3  Those regimes that combine democratic and authoritarian elements (Diamond, 2002). 
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where the authoritarian state has allowed the existence of mobilising structures 
such as trade unions, they have served as focal points for the formation of strong 
opposition parties during the transition, and this has promoted institutionalisa-
tion over time (LeBas, 2011, p. 5). Riedl (2014), in turn, demonstrates how power 
accumulation strategies during the authoritarian era allowed incumbent parties 
to survive the transition and beyond: rulers who had incorporated the local elites 
enjoyed more support and were able to control the transition and build more 
institutionalised party systems. Loxton’s (2018) study on authoritarian successor 
parties worldwide showcases a panoply of forms of authoritarian legacies in-
cluding “(1) a party brand, (2) territorial organization, (3) clientelistic networks, 
(4) source of party finance, and (5) source of party cohesion” (Loxton, 2018, p. 
10). Grzymala-Busse, in turn, explores “usable pasts”, i.e. “the historical record of 
party accomplishments to which the elites can point, and the public perceptions 
of this record”, and “portable skills”, i.e. “the expertise and administrative expe-
riences gained in the previous regime” (Grzymala-Busse, 2002, p. 5). 
In Madagascar, the absence of a strong historical party, the frequent rotation 
in power, and the weakness of the state (Levitsky & Way, 2010a, p. 276) sug-
gest that parties do not benefit much from “usable pasts” or “portable skills”. 
Furthermore, they cannot count on strong economic performance, an effective 
coercive apparatus or a stable patronage machine to avoid intra-party conflict 
and guarantee their survival (Mukonoweshuro, 1990, p. 385; Levitsky & Way, 
2010a, p. 267). Thus, to better understand the fluidity of the Malagasy party sys-
tem, we focus on authoritarian legacies of party formation and their sources of 
elite cohesion and the clientelistic networks. Leadership centralisation, ethnicity, 
personalism and clientelism will be discussed as the key (authoritarian) behav-
ioural patterns structuring party formation and development. 
However, since historical legacies fade over time, it is important to consider 
how party elites continuously reshape the rules of the game to gain leverage over 
their opponents. A “level playing field” is part of any definition of democracy, 
but “competitive authoritarian regimes” are characterised by an uneven playing 
field where “1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; 2) the in-
cumbent party is systematically favoured at the expense of the opposition; and 
3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously hand-
icapped” (Levitsky & Way, 2010b). The analysis here explores how incumbents 
create asymmetries in the playing field by limiting access to resources, the media 
and the law (Levitsky & Way, 2010b); however, and most importantly, it also 
shows the limits of these tactics. 
Though the analysis centres on authoritarian legacies and elites’ tactics, it 
does not neglect the importance of other variables. For instance, it has been ar-
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gued that, where state capacity is lower, “elections are more likely to spin out of 
control, forcing the regime to turn to more blatant forms of fraud or large-scale 
violence, which tends to cause regime destabilisation” (Croissant & Hellman, 
2018, p. 4). The Malagasy party system functions in an environment of low or-
ganisational power, weak state infrastructures and coercive capacity, which have 
left governments more vulnerable to domestic and foreign pressures (Levitsky & 
Way, 2010a, p. 277). Overall political elites have been unable to reduce political 
uncertainty and structure the competition in a predictable way. 
Madagascar’s Third Republic: electoral competition in the 
“new democratic era”
After independence from France in 1960, the First Malagasy Republic was 
led by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and its leader, Philibert Tsiranana, who 
ruled for over a decade before he was forced to resign and hand over power to 
the military. After three years of military rule, in 1975 former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Didier Ratsiraka, was installed as president, marking the beginning of 
the Second Republic. Ratsiraka’s first period as president (1975-1993) was de-
fined by its political commitment to a “Leninist scientific socialism”, demonstrat-
ed through drastic reforms of political and economic institutions (Marcus, 2004, 
p. 2). The “socialist turn” experienced on the island was also felt at the party sys-
tem level because parties were, indeed, allowed to run as long as they supported 
the state’s socialist ideals by joining the FNDR4 (Thibaut, 1999). In this context, the 
AREMA, created by Ratsiraka himself, was, unsurprisingly, the strongest FNDR 
party, often winning elections by a landslide5. However, despite its strong outer 
appearance, AREMA was lacking “organizational and institutional capacity” and 
was “weakly rooted in society” (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 501). 
In addition, the state remained weak and poorly implanted in the countryside; 
Ratsiraka failed to establish control over society and the economy deteriorated 
under his incumbency (Levistky & Way, 2010, p. 277). By the end of the 1980s, 
socialist policies had been laid to rest with the helping hand of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, but crippling debt and economic underperformance still plagued 
the country, leading to a rise in political opposition that was able to challenge 
the ruler. 
4  A total of five parties joined the FNDR and competed in general elections during the Second Republic.
5  In 1983, it won 117 of the 137 seats in the National People’s Assembly, and 120 in 1989, despite fading support 
and adverse economic conditions.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the coming of the Third Wave of democ-
ratisation to Africa made it almost impossible for Ratsiraka to remain in power 
and, in 1991, almost half a million strikers marched in Antananarivo6 and com-
pletely paralysed the economy, forcing the president, later that year, to sign the 
Panorama Convention and allow a transitional government to take over. The fol-
lowing year, the constitution that provided for a semi-presidential system was 
approved via referendum, marking the beginning of the Third Republic. After 
the senate had been abolished under the Second Republic, leaving the National 
Assembly as the unicameral parliament, the new republic reinstated bicameral-
ism and defined a mixed electoral system to elect members of parliament. As for 
the senate, two-thirds of senators are indirectly elected and one-third appointed 
by the president. The president is elected in a two-round system. 
Three critical moments mark the political shifts in the island-state over the 
last three decades or so: first, the 1992/1993 presidential elections and the 1993 
legislative elections marked the beginning of multiparty elections in Madagascar 
(Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 501-502); second, the post-electoral cri-
sis of 2001-2002 put an end to Ratsiraka’s rule and resulted in the rise of Marc 
Ravalomanana; finally, the 2009 coup d’état led to the resignation of the demo-
cratically elected president Marc Ravalomanana and consequent political crisis 
that signalled the end of the Third Republic and ultimately led to the consolida-
tion of Andry Rajoelina. 
Though Madagascar is a semi-presidential regime, presidential elections are 
the most relevant and mark the tone of electoral competition. Legislative elec-
tions have taken place after the presidential race since the outset of democratic 
transition, which means they have a confirmatory status and mainly serve to 
secure parliamentary support for the incumbent president. This “honeymoon” 
between presidential and parliamentary elections is confirmed by the fact that 
the party (or allies) that support the winning presidential candidate eventually 
win a majority in the national assembly elections. However, competition is far 
from predictable: there is frequent rotation in power at both the parliament and 
presidency levels, independent office seekers easily break through (Table 1 and 
Table 2), and the effective number of parliamentary parties fluctuates significant-
ly (Figure 1). 
6  Political support for Ratsiraka was always weaker in urban areas, especially in the Merina’s traditional 
stronghold (Antananarivo). Because of the disastrous economic reforms and the decentralisation process that 
focused mainly on the rural areas, urban living standards worsened sharply – hence the easier mobilisation of 
the urban population on the 1991 strike (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 502).
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Figure 1: Effective number of parliamentary parties
Source: Authors’ elaboration
In the first three presidential races, Albert Zafy, Didier Ratsiraka and Marc 
Ravalomanana were successively elected and managed to secure parliamentary 
support. Thus, in the 1993 parliamentary elections the political grouping with 
the most votes was the Hery Velona, an alliance of President Zafy, the Rally for 
Social Democracy (RPSD) and the Movement for Proletarian Power (MFM). Zafy 
was eventually impeached for violation of the constitution but contested the 1996 
election. His main challenger was the former authoritarian leader Ratsiraka, who 
eventually won the race in the second round (Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). The coalition 
Hery Velona was disbanded, paving the way for a clear victory for AREMA (Table 
1). 
In 2001, Marc Ravalomanana won the presidential elections amid great con-
troversy. After it was reported that Ravalomanana was leading the polls with over 
50% of the vote, the National Electoral Committee (CNE) opted to continue the 
count behind closed doors, raising some concerns. When the High Constitutional 
Court (HCC) announced the results, neither Ravalomanana nor Ratsiraka had 
secured a majority of the votes, meaning that, under the constitution, a second 
round was needed. Thousands of protesters took to the streets in support of 
Ravalomanana, demanding a recount, and he decided to act on the will of the 
people and declared himself president. In response, Ratsiraka declared a State 
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of Emergency, put the nation under Martial Law and established his political 
stronghold, Toamasina, as the new “capital”. With the country divided in two, oil 
and food supplies to Antananarivo cut off and increasingly violent protests, the 
nation was on the brink of civil war when Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana agreed 
on a recount. Following these events, a newly constituted HCC announced that 
Ravalomanana had won with 51.46% of the vote (compared with Ratsiraka’s 
35.90%) and the new president was inaugurated in May. Unwilling to accept the 
results, Ratsiraka fled to France, putting an end to the civil unrest (Marcus, 2004, 
pp. 6-11).
The 2002 legislative elections that followed the national crisis proved the 
widespread support for Ravalomanana’s party, I Love Madagascar (TIM): TIM 
won 102 of the 156 seats in parliament whereas their close allies, Firaisankinam-
Pirenena, won 20 seats. With independent candidates taking over 23 seats, no 
other party made much of an impact. Confirming Ratsiraka’s downfall, AREMA 
took only three seats, all of them elected from Toamasina. It should be noted 
that, prior to the election, AREMA was divided in two factions, with one of them 
(“Front du Refus”) boycotting the elections (European Parliament, 2003, p. 5). 
Despite some success in former elections, MFM had only two successful candi-
dates and LEADER-Fanilo only one (European Parliament, 2003). The rapid rise 
of TIM and the equally sudden fall of some of the traditional parties (such as 
AREMA, LEADER-Fanilo and MFM) demonstrates the weak institutionalisation 
of political parties in Madagascar and points to the country’s political instability 
(Marcus, 2010). 
The following cycle of elections witnessed a repetition of this trend: 
Ravalomanana won the 2006 presidential race and his party TIM increased its 
share of seats to 66.3% in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Between these two 
elections, there was a national referendum that sought, among other things, to 
increase presidential powers and redefine the island’s administrative divisions 
(Marcus, 2010, p. 126). As the 2007 referendum shows, Ravalomanana used his 
second presidential term to extend his power and neopatrimonial network. 
Authoritarianism increased under Ravalomanana but he faced strong contes-
tation. Andry Rajoelina, the mayor of Antananarivo, and founder of the politi-
cal party Determined Malagasy Youth (TGV), gained visibility after criticising a 
deal that the government intended to seal with Daewoo, which implied leasing 
about 1.3 million hectares of Malagasy land without clear benefits to the people 
(Marcus, 2010, p. 123). 
In late 2008, when the president ordered the closing of Rajoelina’s television 
station VIVA after it broadcast an interview featuring former president Ratsiraka, 
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the young mayor used this to incite thousands of Malagasy to take to the streets 
of the capital. The protests faced violent repression and dozens of citizens were 
reported dead or injured. The president’s unwillingness to reopen the TV station 
led Rajoelina to declare himself president of a transitional government, which 
had no constitutional support. The president reacted by firing him from the 
office of mayor of Antananarivo, which contributed to further deterioration of 
Ravalomanana’s support amongst the general population and, more important-
ly, the military elites of the country. After the mutiny of a small group of soldiers, 
the military decided to take action, forcing Ravalomanana to hand over power 
to the military in March 2009 – power was then handed Rajoelina, who became, 
officially, the president of the High Transitional Authority (HAT) (Cawthra, 2010, 
p. 14; The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 17-18).
While this was widely perceived as a coup d’état, Rajoelina headed the HAT 
government until 2013. He proposed a new constitution to enhance presiden-
tial powers but, as in the past, lack of transparency meant that voters were not 
fully aware of what this new constitution implied, causing several opposition 
parties to boycott the act. Therefore, the constitution that inaugurated the Fourth 
Republic was approved by 74.2% of the vote. Ahead of the 2013 elections, tensions 
continued to escalate between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, until the mediation 
process opted for what they called a “ni ni” solution, a mutual agreement that ex-
cluded both of them from the future election and resulted in a “proxy election”: 
Ravalomanana chose Jean-Louis Robinson, a former World Health Organization 
official, to represent his interests and Rajoelina picked former finance minister, 
Hery Rajaonarimampianina (The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 17-18).
A record 33 candidates participated in the presidential race and the results 
were widely spread. Robinson (Ravalomanana’s candidate) led the first round 
of voting with only 21.2% of the vote and Rajaonarimampianina followed 
with 15.9%. Neither Robinson nor Rajaonarimampianina were supported by 
Ravalomanana’s TIM or Rajoelina’s TGV. Instead, the leading candidates were 
backed by the newly-formed New Forces for Madagascar (Rajaonarimampianina) 
and Avana (Robinson). Despite leading the first round, Robinson lost the election 
to Rajaonarimampianina in a tight second round vote.
The 2013 post-crisis general elections were, in some way, a return to normal-
cy. The political movements behind each candidate gathered most of the vote, 
with a clear victory to Miaraka Aminny Andry Rajoelina (MAPAR), winning 49 
seats against TIM’s 20 seats. Rajaonarimampianina became the only president 
in Madagascar’s history to win a presidential election without the correspond-
ing party winning (or even contending) the legislative election. Opposition from 
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smaller parties seemed to have increased again as new parties and independ-
ent candidates continued to flourish. In office, Rajaonarimampianina proceed-
ed to distance himself politically from his supporter Rajoelina (Bozzini, 2018). 
However, this did not translate into political stability for the nation. Three differ-
ent prime-ministers were appointed in the course of four years and the president 
himself suffered an attempted impeachment in May 2015 (Freedom House, 2016).
Elections for the senate and local government were only held at the end of 
2015, about two years into Rajaonarimampianina’s presidency, after which the 
government was, for the first time since the 2009 coup d’état, fully in place. The 
president’s party polled about 65% of the vote in local elections and he him-
self appointed, as the constitution allows, one-third of the senate. Rajoelina 
along with MAPAR became a strong political voice in opposition, regularly ask-
ing the president to step down and urging early elections. The “honeymoon” 
between presidential and parliamentary elections was eventually restored as 
Andry Rajoelina would be elected president in the 2018 presidential race while 
his MAPAR7 gained 84 of the 151 parliamentary seats in 2019. Ravalomanana’s 
TIM was down to 16 and 46 independent candidates entered parliament. Overall, 
elections in Madagascar show repeated instability, unpredictability, frequent 
political change and significant gains for new and president-led parties, and in-
dependent office seekers. The following sections explore the factors underlying 
these dynamics. 
Authoritarian legacies
The most relevant parties that have emerged since independence were creat-
ed by political elites, bringing together divergent interests. Given the absence of 
mobilising structures, such as strong trade unions, and of clear ideologies and 
programs, political parties had to grow from scratch, on the basis of calculations 
by the elites. Hence, political parties in Madagascar emerged from above, created 
by influential or charismatic leaders, and mainly relied on ethnicity, personal-
ism and neopatrimonialism to build internal and external support. This can be 
seen in the independence period and throughout the authoritarian era but, in 
addition, current political parties in Madagascar are extremely dependent on the 
wealth and prestige of their leader, and few survive if their leader loses the pres-
idency. Parties have shown little capacity to strengthen their grass-roots organi-
7  Interestingly, Rajoelina won the presidential election with the support of TGV (his first party), but MAPAR 
(Rajoelina’s party during Rajaonarimampianina’s presidency) replaced it in the parliamentary elections. Once 
again, this may indicate the poor institutionalisation of political parties in Madagascar.
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sation and interparty competition is generally more defined by ethnic, personal 
and clientelistic ties than by ideologies. 
In terms of ideologies, AREMA aimed to implement a program of “scientif-
ic socialism” but the party lacked the institutional capacity to meet its goals. 
Neopatrimonial in nature, the true strength of AREMA was almost solely based 
on the figure of Ratsiraka and his personal connections, as its support base de-
rived directly from the president’s patronage networks, partially made up of 
former PSD supporters, including prominent military figures, businessmen, rich 
families and local elites from various provinces. As a consequence, many close 
friends or relatives of the president were seen occupying significant political po-
sitions during this period. Nicknamed “Deba” (which translates as “Big Man”), 
Ratsiraka was of Betsimisiraka ethnicity and had his political stronghold in the 
coastal Toamasina, away from the capital city. The “Red Admiral”8 was, for a 
period, able use his decentralising policies to juggle the island’s ethnic divides, 
stripping the Antananarivo-based Merina ethnic group of its traditional con-
trol of both the administration and the economy but appointing close Merina 
acquaintances to important governmental roles. The apparent decentralisation 
was, however, a strategy that made it easier for the executive to make top-down 
decisions. Even when Ratsiraka’s popularity began to fall, considerable influxes 
of foreign aid from international partners (in response to the country’s bankrupt-
cy) were largely perceived as a gesture of support for the island’s authoritarian 
leader. However, strong perceptions of corruption and the increasing marginal-
isation of the Merina people were seen as contributing significantly to the decay 
of national unity and support for the regime (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, 
p. 501; The World Bank, 2010, p. 12). 
Despite losing the founding presidential/parliamentary elections, Ratsiraka 
and AREMA returned to power in 1996/1998. Ratsiraka, however, following the 
same old way of doing politics, proceeded to re-establish himself in the coastal 
provinces as part of a long-term strategy. Moreover, reverting to his neopatrimo-
nial roots, he once again put his close friends and relatives in significant political 
positions and helped them achieve control over the economy by providing com-
mercial and industrial opportunities (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 503). 
Besides AREMA, two other noteworthy parties emerged on the Madagascar 
scene: Albert Zafy’s Hery Velona and Marc Ravalomanana’s TIM somehow 
built their strengths on their leaders’ neopatrimonial networks (Marcus & 
Ratsimbaharison, 2005). Being essentially an “electoralist catch-all party”, the 
8  “Red admiral” is a term used to refer to the highest ranked admiral in the navy, a position once occupied by 
Ratsiraka. It was also a reference to his commitment to the socialist cause, also associated with the colour red.
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Hery Velona suffered from serious “internal heterogeneity” and lacked a coher-
ent ideology, which impeded stable government (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 
2005, pp. 502-503). When his turn came, Zafy followed the pattern of most (if not 
all) Malagasy presidents, taking clear advantage of the country’s weak demo-
cratic institutions to consolidate his power9. He turned Hery Velona into his own 
neopatrimonial network, much as Ratsiraka had with AREMA, but his efforts to 
impede attempts to amend the constitution in order to limit presidential powers 
were generally not well received, and he was impeached in 1996 on charges of 
corruption (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 502-504; Thibaut, 1999, p. 533). 
In Malagasy political parties, personalism and neopatrimonialism cannot be 
read separate from ethnicity. The Merina-Côtier10 ethnic divide has shaped pol-
itics in the country since colonial times and political leaders continue to exploit 
it. It has served as the political pretext for the creation of the PSD, and later for 
AREMA. The two parties had also in common the fact that they were a “loose 
coalition of divergent interests” (Allen & Covell, 2005). AREMA was the creation 
of Didier Ratsiraka, a côtier from the Betsimisaraka ethnic group. Côtier resent-
ment of Merina was just one of the strategies used by Ratsiraka to gain political 
support, as in “Antananarivo-centred dissent and in his unsuccessful calls for 
‘federal’ secession in 1992 and 2002” (Allen & Covell, 2005, p. 68). 
Scholars like Cole (1998) also point to the ethnic dimension behind the rise of 
Hery Velona. Capitalising on the failure of Ratsiraka’s policies to benefit the urban 
population, Hery Velona’s support was mostly based in the Antananarivo area 
and, according to Cole, they “spoke with enthusiasm about the upcoming chang-
es”, referring to the 1992/1993 elections. On other parts of the island, AREMA 
would actually promote ethnic tensions, claiming that the Merina, whose inter-
ests were represented by Hery Velona, would enslave the coastal people11, “were 
they given the opportunity by this election” (Cole, 1998, p. 617). Later, during the 
2001/2002 political crisis, Ratsiraka played the ethnic card again, going as far as 
inciting “his supporters to pretend to be Merina and threaten côtier groups”, in an 
attempt give the appearance of an ethnic conflict (Marcus, 2004, pp. 9-10). 
Considering the Malagasy party system and the country’s historical eth-
nic divide, one cannot help but acknowledge the immense success of Marc 
Ravalomanana as a candidate, and of his party. Before Ravalomanana entered 
9  Zafy used the referendum to gain the right to appoint the Prime Minister, and to weaken provincial power to 
the benefit of the central government (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Thibaut, 1999). 
10  The term côtier designates other ethnicities than the Merina, which is the dominant and historically advantaged 
ethnic group (Allen & Covell, 2005).
11  A direct reference to the 19th century Merina enslavement of the côtiers. This was the experience of the 
Betsimisaraka, the ethnic group covered by Cole’s anthropological research, which Ratsiraka claimed to be his 
own (Cole, 1998, p. 617).
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the political scene, it was very unlikely that a Merina candidate would win a 
presidential election, mostly because it was very unrealistic to expect him to win 
outside the Antananarivo province. In reality, the Merina leader went on to de-
feat Ratsiraka in several coastal provinces, including some that had historically 
voted against Merina candidates and, even though he lost there, he did manage to 
achieve a good result in his rival’s hometown. Even though Ratsiraka had “spent 
his entire second presidency manipulating institutions and deepening his per-
sonal networks”, Ravalomanana prevailed in the election for three main reasons: 
first, the unpopularity of his opponent and the population’s growing demand for 
a change; second, his role as a businessman, with a liberal approach to the econ-
omy and the power to make a real change; and finally, his nationalist campaign, 
which, during a time of crisis, urged the various ethnic groups to stand together 
for the country’s greater good. We cannot, however, underestimate the impor-
tance of Ravalomanana’s dairy company Tiko, one of the country’s biggest and 
most internationalised companies, which was a fundamental tool in the estab-
lishment of Ravalomanana and TIM, being not only a considerable source of par-
ty funding but also the place where Ravalomanana recruited his personal elite. 
After his election, the senate saw Ratsiraka’s supporters replaced by individuals 
who served both the party and the company. Tiko was thus a means of strength-
ening the new party before the elections and the neopatrimonial base that would 
hold it together (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 504-508). As we shall see 
in the next section, Tiko was also important in the way Ravalomanana skewed 
the playing field. 
An uneven playing field 
Since the beginning of the Third Republic, all the presidents have changed the 
constitution to increase their power, but they resort to other strategies to gain lev-
erage over their opponents, and this is particularly evident during elections. The 
political playing field may be uneven in a variety of ways, but three are of par-
ticular importance: unequal access to resources, the media, and the law (Levitsky 
& Way, 2010b). When the incumbent is able either to easily “appropriate state 
resources” and “make widespread partisan use of public [means]” or to fund 
personal businesses or party-owned enterprises through “public credit, conces-
sions, licensing, privatization or other policy instruments”, it means the opposi-
tion cannot compete on a level playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 58). 
In Madagascar politics is often contested by very wealthy individuals, which 
negates asymmetries in access to state resources. As in most African countries, 
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access to state resources is important, and generally benefits the incumbent par-
ty, but there are alternative pathways to power for those in opposition. Parties 
created by wealthy leaders can rely on the leader’s resource base, and neopatri-
monial networks to build support and this has been one of the keys to incum-
bents keeping the playing field uneven, but it has also made it possible for some 
new contenders successfully to challenge incumbents.
Before entering politics as mayor of Antananarivo in 1999, Ravalomanana 
was already a household name amongst the business elite, a “self-made million-
aire” who owned a big company and had just founded his own party (Marcus 
& Ratsimbaharison, 2005, p. 506). Despite being new to presidential elections, 
Ravalomanana had, in Tiko, a robust campaign machine at his disposal: on the 
one hand, it was the source of his revenue, allowing him to spend huge amounts of 
money on his campaign; on the other, Tiko’s merchandise could be found through-
out the country, even in the most remote villages, making Ravalomanana’s brand 
and name well-known throughout the territory. Traditionally, such breadth of 
coverage has been problematic for many candidates. The island’s size and the 
lack of an efficient transport system has made it very difficult for every contender 
to campaign in every province, and it made this millionaire’s personal helicopter 
a useful asset (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005; Moser, 2004, p. 8). In an attempt 
to skew the playing field, Ratsiraka increased the candidacy fees, making it very 
difficult for smaller/independent candidates to participate (Marcus, 2004, pp. 
5-6), but this strategy could not fend off candidates as wealthy as Ravalomanana, 
who successfully challenged Ratsiraka’s presidency. 
With regard to disparities in resources, the situation only worsened when 
the new president took office, as Ravalomanana’s immense private wealth had 
merged with state resources. The Tiko Group’s subsidiaries constantly received 
favourable treatment in awarding government contracts, working closely with 
foreign companies and purchasing privatised state companies, and it expand-
ed exponentially12 during Ravalomanana’s first presidency. And the overlap be-
tween the Tiko elite and the TIM elite, the line between private and public became 
increasingly blurred. Tiko’s dominance also had consequences for the already 
waning opposition, which could be more easily punished and weakened by be-
ing excluded by the government from economic opportunities (Marcus, 2010, p. 
122).
12  Tiko Group was comprised of more than a dozen corporations, working across diverse sectors of the economy. 
Besides their original dairy products, Tiko operated in “bottled water, fruit juice, vegetable oils, raw materials 
extraction, animal husbandry, agriculture, television, radio, newspapers, printing, manufacturing, civil engi-
neering, food distribution, and private aircraft storage” (Marcus, 2010, p. 122).
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With the merging of public and private and TIM and Tiko, Ravalomanana 
managed to increase the imbalance on the playing field far more than it had been 
under Ratsiraka and almost to extinguish opposition. Candidates were expect-
ed not only to pay high fees to participate in elections, but also to print their 
own ballots, adding to the cost of the electoral process. This excluded several 
contenders who could not afford to run, with some not having the resources to 
print enough ballots for every constituency, and it benefitted those with more 
financial resources (EISA, 2007). As a result, Ravalomanana became the first (and 
so far only) candidate, since the end of the Second Republic, to win a presidential 
election without going to a second round, having secured over 50% of the vote 
in the first round.
Despite a very uneven playing field during Ravalomanana’s tenure as presi-
dent, it was still not enough to extend his rule over the island, as another strong 
contender had emerged: Andry Rajoelina, the young founder of the TGV party 
and owner of the VIVA radio and television station, among other enterprises. The 
similarities between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana were undeniable: both were 
self-made Merina millionaires who had become mayors of the capital amid the 
presidency of an increasingly authoritarian leader and both owned media enter-
prises that were crucial for voicing criticism and to mobilising the population.
In the elections that followed (2013 and 2019), the issues concerning the lack 
of party/campaign finance regulation and of transparency regarding each candi-
date’s spending13 continued, unsurprisingly, to be pointed out as one of the big-
gest flaws in the Malagasy electoral process (The Carter Center, 2013, pp. 28-36).
On a different level, if equal access to resources is necessary for fair elections, 
the same goes for equal access to the media. Levitsky and Way’s (2010b) under-
standing of what makes access to the media unequal is perfectly illustrated in 
Madagascar: the playing field is skewed if “the state either monopolizes broad-
cast media or operates the only television and radio stations with a national au-
dience” (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 59). During Madagascar’s multiparty history, 
unequal access to media has seen no dramatic changes. The president and the rul-
ing party usually dominate public media (television and radio), which is the only 
media that covers the whole territory. Private and print media have traditionally 
been free from government-imposed restrictions but generally lack the capacity 
to reach broader audiences (EISA, 2008). During the 2001 presidential elections, 
the government imposed restrictions on the media, ensuring that only the news 
13  According to Global Voices, in 2018: “During the 2013 presidential elections, then-elected President Hery 
Rajaonarimampianina spent 43 million dollars – the equivalent of 21.3 dollars per voters – double the amount 
spent by US President Donald Trump in 2016.” Available at: https://globalvoices.org/2018/12/13/in-madagasgar-
costly-presidential-campaigns-dont-add-up-to-a-better-life-for-citizens/ (accessed 30 September 2019).
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agencies chosen by Ratsiraka himself could cover the election (Marcus, 2004, pp. 
6-8). As seen in Ravalomanana’s and Rajoelina’s paths to political power, access 
to media is crucial for mustering political support and these two candidates ben-
efited from having their own television/radio stations, when, as members of the 
opposition, their access to the media was limited.
Finally, even if access to state resources and to the media are equal between 
incumbent and opposition, a playing field cannot be levelled if there is not equal 
access to the law. In this scenario, incumbents “control the judiciary, the elec-
toral authorities, and other nominally independent arbiters”, removing their 
autonomy and impartiality, making them unreliable and using them to harass 
the opposition. The incumbent enjoys legal impunity, while the opposition can-
not denounce injustice effectively (Levitsky & Way, 2010b, p. 60). Throughout 
Madagascar’s Third Republic there have been several instances when the insti-
tutions lacked the required autonomy to make decisions fully independent from 
the executive or when the law was deployed to hinder the opposition.
For example, while the High Constitutional Court (HCC) remained independ-
ent of the executive during Zafy’s administration, even allowing for his impeach-
ment, Ratsiraka’s return to power brought a decrease in the autonomy of the 
political institutions. During his presidency, the HCC was used to crush his op-
position in the 1999 local elections, by altering the results “through a series of 
controversial court decisions” that allowed AREMA and its allies to win (Marcus 
& Ratsimbaharison, 2005, pp. 502–504). On another occasion, at the 2001 presi-
dential elections, when the Committee to Elect Marc Ravalomanana (KMMR) re-
ported that he was leading the polls with 54.95% of the vote, Ratsiraka pressured 
the CNE to continue the voting process behind closed doors. The result did not 
give Ravalomanana immediate victory14, although both the KMMR initial count 
and the Consortium of Election Observers (CNOE), a civil society group, gave 
Ravalomanana over 50% of the vote. The discrepancy in figures produced by the 
different bodies was suspicious and raised questions about the CNE’s autonomy, 
and the absence of international observers only diminished the credibility of the 
results. With the other bodies unable to access the remaining third of the votes, 
the results were highly controversial. It was up to the HCC to publish the official 
results, but the composition of the HCC had been changed by order of the in-
cumbent a few months before, making the HCC obviously more likely to support 
Ratsiraka. In the same elections, Ravalomanana tried unsuccessfully to petition 
the HCC to disqualify Ratsiraka on the grounds that he had violated the electoral 
14  The incumbent president received 40.61% of the vote, while his new challenger obtained 46.44%. With neither 
having an absolute majority of votes, the constitution required a second round.
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law, namely by using state resources for his personal campaign (Marcus, 2004, 
pp. 6-8).
Ravalomanana, too, has used the HCC to fend off potential challengers. In 
the 2006 presidential election, the HCC disqualified four candidates on differ-
ent grounds, three of whom were widely regarded as Ravalomanana’s strongest 
opponents: exiled opposition leader and former deputy prime-minister under 
Ratsiraka, Pierrot Rajaonarivelo15, who was not allowed to return to Madagascar 
to formalise his candidacy; General Randrianafidiosa, another strong rival, who 
refused to pay Ariary 25,000,000 to run; and Didier Ratsiraka himself, because his 
residence in France made him unable to submit his candidacy in person (as the 
law requires) (EISA, 2007).
An example of Ravalomanana’s abuse of the law was the matter of the alloca-
tion of seats right before the 2007 parliamentary election. According to the EISA 
mission, it was “undertaken without any clear or defined criteria”, not taking 
into consideration the size of the constituencies, and thus eroding the principle 
of “one person, one vote”. For instance, while the constituency of Antananarivo 
II had two seats allocated for a population of about 130,000, the constituency of 
Mananjary had one seat for a population of over 700,000. This was largely per-
ceived as a strategy by the president to strengthen his political heartland and 
weaken the regions where the opposition was traditionally stronger. Facing an 
increasingly uneven playing field, some opposition parties decided to join forces 
in specific constituencies where they had no advantage in running alone, but TIM 
still ended up winning 105 of the 127 possible seats (EISA, 2008).
These are just illustrations of how the playing field is constantly reshaped and 
adjusted in the interests of the party/president of the day. The tactics described 
above are so prevalent that those in opposition behave in the same way when 
they get into power. In fact, parties in Madagascar behave not as agents of de-
mocracy but as agents of neopatrimonialism (Marcus & Ratsimbaharison, 2005), 
and resort to other mechanisms – access to law and media (public and private) 
– to skew competition in their favour. Paradoxically, however, this analysis also 
demonstrates the limits of these tactics in Madagascar’s politics. The extreme vol-
atility and turnover in elections, and the sudden rise and fall of political parties 
and leaders, suggest that these strategies are not as effective as expected and fail 
to reduce electoral uncertainty. At best parties and presidents only achieve short-
term gains. 
15  Previously, Rajaonarivelo was sentenced in absentia for misappropriation of state funds, a charge he 
claimed was politically motivated. Ravalomanana would close the country’s international airports every time 
Rajaonarivelo tried to fly to the island.
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Conclusion
This article’s main goal was to understand why the Madagascar party system 
has remained fluid, showing no signs of consolidation since the beginning of 
the Third Republic. The explanatory model developed here has explored party 
building strategies during the authoritarian era, and also the extent to which in-
cumbents have successfully skewed the playing field to their advantage. 
Regarding authoritarian legacies, we noted that parties emerged from above 
on the basis of elites’ calculations to enter the political contest. Parties generally 
lacked strong organisation and social anchors, and represented loose interests 
and vague ideologies. In this context, neopatrimonial leadership in combination 
with ethnic identity and personalism, have been essential assets for party devel-
opment since independence and beyond the Third Republic. Indeed, party or-
ganisations that emerged in Madagascar during the last two decades have traits 
that can be traced back to the First and Second Republics: centralised leadership, 
thin organisation, lack of core ideologies and prevalence of ethnic, personal and 
clientelistic appeals. Precisely because they relied more on material sources of 
support – that is on their ability to reward their supporters – rather than on more 
symbolic and ideological foundations, these parties have proven more vulnera-
ble and less durable.
Regarding the playing field, observing key electoral moments allowed us to 
reveal the ways in which the rules of the game are in constant flux. Incumbent 
parties take advantage of state resources to further expand their neopatrimonial 
networks but also rely on the wealth, prestige and visibility of their leaders; but 
so do opposition parties that successfully challenge incumbency. Overall, there 
are no substantive differences in party behaviour: those in opposition eventually 
mimic the same actions when they get into power. 
The analysis also highlighted important paradoxes that deserve further dis-
cussion. On the one hand, the attempts of presidents/parties to change the rules 
of the game have failed to guarantee their survival over time. While elsewhere in 
Africa, skewing the playing field is a strategy that incumbent autocrats have used 
to maintain their position, in Madagascar, parties and candidates do not stay 
long in power; on the contrary, there is a high electoral turnover. On the other 
hand, by showing the limits of these tactics, this study also points to an endemic 
instability built on the origins of political parties, and the weakness of the state. 
But taking this discussion further, there seems to be a pattern in the rise and 
fall of parties and candidates in Madagascar that might help explain why strat-
egies of creating uneven playing fields has not contributed to the consolidation 
63João Pedro Garrido Conduto & Edalina Rodrigues Sanches
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2019  •  38, 41-66
of a stable authoritarian leadership but rather has resulted in a high frequency of 
changes of power. Despite successful attempts by Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana 
to skew the playing field, their opponents (Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, re-
spectively) had access to resources that allowed them to overcome imbalances: 
immense personal wealth that compensated for the lack of access to state re-
sources, business enterprises in television and radio to counter the uneven ac-
cess to the media, and popular support that enabled them to contest unequal 
access to the law. While the playing field was indeed rigged enough to neutralise 
the remaining forces of the opposition, this combination of factors allowed both 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina to compete on the same level as the incumbents. 
The only exception seems to have been in the transfer of power from Zafy to 
Ratsiraka, in 1996. However, given that Zafy was peacefully removed from office 
through an impeachment process, we can make a case for there having been a 
not-so uneven playing field. The electoral contest between Rajaonarimampianina 
and Robinson does not count as an exception, since Ravalomanana and Rajoelina 
were not allowed to contend; had they been allowed, the other two candidates 
would not have stood a chance, given the conditions of the playing field. 
Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the functioning com-
petitive authoritarianism in contexts of weak parties, weak state structures and 
ineffective coercive structures, which also seem to characterise other countries on 
the continent, such as Malawi, Kenya, Zambia and Comoros. Further research 
should continue to explore how the various forms of authoritarian legacy impact 
the contemporary dynamics of party system development, and how incumbent 
and opposition parties interact in a competitive authoritarian regime. In particu-
lar, it is important to examine the strategies used by both sides and why and 
when tactics to skew the playing field succeed or fail. 
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